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ABSTRACT

Let Us Live to Make Men Free: Locke and Aquinas on Toleration and Natural Law
by
Micah Safsten, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2022

Major Professor: Anthony Peacock
Department: Political Science
Natural law theory claims that an objective standard for civil law exists, and that it is
capable of being understood through reason. This universality of natural law suggests that
tolerance for opposing the natural law must be limited then, because an understanding of the law
is available to everyone. Yet if there is little tolerance for dissent in a political community, it is
difficult to envision the deliberation necessary for understanding the precepts of the natural law.
Natural law theorists have dealt with this challenge in different ways.
John Locke’s natural law is highly individualistic and allows for sweeping tolerance, as
individuals are permitted to pursue their own understanding of the good life. Thomas Aquinas’
natural law is moral and places responsibilities on the individual to pursue the good. While this
allows for a much narrower view tolerance, Aquinas also understood man as capable of
reasoning about the good. Removing the opportunity to reason in earnest about the good neglects
the dignity due to each person. Thus, a specific vision for tolerance can be borne out of Aquinas’
natural law- one that exists for the purpose of persuasion and deliberation.
Looking at each of these two philosophers presents us with two different modes of
tolerance. The first is transactional tolerance, and it serves the good of peace and order. It does
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not encourage deliberation. Rather, it represents a truce between two sides. The second it the
tolerance that Aquinas requires us to hold, that of moral tolerance. This is tolerance for the
allowance of difference so that deliberation may continue. While transactional tolerance sees
tolerance as a good in itself, moral tolerance sees it as a secondary good. This thesis will argue in
favor of moral tolerance as a way to better promulgate natural law understandings of the good
life. Understanding a moral defense of tolerance provides us with a natural law justification for
tolerance regimes and institutions. It also shows us how we might better engage in civic and
political life with those we disagree with.
(53 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Let Us Live to Make Men Free: Locke and Aquinas on Toleration and Natural Law

Micah Safsten
Tolerance is a difficult and controversial concept in political rhetoric. For many,
tolerance requires the acceptance of what one believes is evil. Still, most of us feel as though we
must accept the differences of others on some level. This thesis is an attempt to better understand
tolerance. To do so, it uses the concept of natural law, or the idea that all law should justified
through one, universal theory of good. This would seem contradictory, as natural law supposes
that a single vision of the good life exists for all. Yet the natural law theory of one legal theorist,
Thomas Aquinas, rests on the idea that every person possesses the ability to comprehend what is
good through reason.
This additional caveat of Aquinas’ natural law provides us with a specific understanding
of tolerance that exists to provide space for others to reason and learn about what is good. This
will stand in contrast to the more common justification of tolerance today: that a truce between
competing sides in necessary to keep the peace and maintain order. This is a sentiment
sometimes echoed by John Locke, whose liberal vision of government allowed each individual
the ability to choose. We will see, however, that liberal government is difficult without authentic
deliberation- something only available in a view of tolerance that confronts moral differences
and seeks to amend them in a reasoned way.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2015, the Utah Legislature passed a pair of bills that protected the rights of religious
individuals and their churches to act according to their beliefs, while simultaneously instituting
antidiscrimination laws protecting LGBT rights. S.B. 296 and S.B. 297, known together as “The
Utah Compromise,” protected the right of individuals to express their religious beliefs in the
workplace. It also protected the right of churches and state-employees to decline to perform
same-sex weddings. Still, the bill requires the state to provide a “willing celebrant” to perform
such a marriage. Further protections for LGBT individuals include the prohibition of denying
housing or employment on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.
The sponsor of both bills (who is now President of the Utah Senate), Senator Stuart
Adams, defended the tolerant nature of the bill, writing that “learning to live and work with those
who do not share beliefs and values is imperative. People view their religious identity and their
sexual identity as core fundamental values and as such, those values deserve respect and fair
treatment” (2015). The process by which diverse individuals and their elected leaders find ways
to live together is one of the central challenges of modern politics. As modern political regimes
and institutions bring us all in close proximity to each other, both literally and figuratively, our
differences become more apparent and tolerance becomes ever more challenging.
The Utah Compromise reveals why tolerance can seem so difficult. Both sides of the
debate have a set of competing commitments. On the one hand, both sides are committed to what
they believe is right. Historically, this commitment took the form of religious conviction, and in
the case of the Utah Compromise, this was true of one side as well. Still, this commitment can be
toward other objects deemed to be good. It might be scientific or empirical evidence, traditions,

2
national identities, personal relationships, or a score of other objects we are committed to. Our
commitment to what is good can come in conflict, however, with a second commitment: simply
not wanting to dispute with our neighbors. The reasons for avoiding dispute may simply be a
desire for peace, or a legitimate interest in their wellbeing, but these two competing
commitments are the seeds of tolerance.
The goal of this thesis will be to better understand this conflict and propose a framework
for tolerance that best balances these two commitments. It will suggest that one need not
abandon this first commitment to what is good, in order to ensure the second desire for harmony.
This will depend on an understanding of human nature as naturally capable of reason, and a need
to freely choose what is good. Tolerance, then, becomes a means to an end. It serves to promote
a vision of the good in politics.
The work of two philosophers will aid this project: John Locke and Thomas Aquinas.
Locke will provide a well-developed theory of law and government, one where tolerance is a
primary feature. His work will account primarily for the second of these two desires (the desire
for order, peace, and harmony), as he proposes a framework by which individuals enter political
society for the protection of property and as a bulwark against a state of war. While Hobbes or
Rousseau may have been better selections for theories based in peace and order, Locke seeks
these things indirectly, and tolerance is a key part of his means for achieving it. Locke will,
however, leave tolerance a puzzling concept, as he considers it in two different ways: both as an
awkward truce between opposing sides and as a moral imperative used to persuade. We will
ultimately see that without clear direction, societies will tend to employ the former conception of
tolerance, which will be considered “transactional tolerance.” As we turn to Aquinas, we will
find its corollary, previously alluded to, in “moral tolerance.”
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Aquinas, at first, would seem an unusual inclusion in an essay on tolerance. Though he
did write about tolerance, Aquinas’ primary contribution comes through his understanding of
natural law and human nature. For Aquinas, man is a creature capable of reason and intelligence.
This includes the ability to comprehend the good through reason. Comprehending the good,
furthermore, will allow one to comprehend the natural law. This is justification for allowing the
natural law to inform one of what the civil law should be. This conception of man as an
intelligent being capable of reason should neither require us to enact the natural law by fiat, nor
does it ask us to remove all laws and let each man govern himself. Rather, it requires us to reason
with each other about the good, then to protect these goods with law after such deliberation has
taken place. This, in practice, includes an act of toleration where we allow diverse individuals to
choose their own way and come to their own conclusions through reason.
Law, then, serves to protect what has been reasoned to be good, while also providing a
space to learn in earnest about those goods. The specifics of what is and is not to be tolerated are
important, prudential questions. This thesis will seek to provide only a very brief overview of
what this prudence might look like, but it is not the goal here to precisely define the parameters
of what is to be tolerated in a given moment. Rather, it is the goal here to define this conception
of moral tolerance as a primary part of political rhetoric in modern life. Rather than seeking for
mere compromise, the goal should be the legitimate welfare of others through persuasion. The
legal and policy elements may not change significantly between these two forms of tolerance,
but the way elected officials and their voters talk about their differences shape future decisions.
This thesis will contain three parts. First, it will provide an overview of Locke and
Aquinas and how each viewed law, morality, and human nature. We will see how Locke
included elements of both forms of tolerance in his theory of liberal government. We will also
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see how Aquinas understood law and its role in cultivating virtue. Aquinas’ view of tolerance
and human nature will also be discussed. The second part of this thesis will focus primarily on
transactional tolerance. It will start by discussing tolerance as a concept, then transition into how
transactional tolerance evolves in a democratic society. The third and final part will open with an
account of moral deliberation, something crucially missing in transactional tolerance. It will then
engage with two theories of civic obligation: Locke’s and those of communitarian philosophers.
It will attempt to show how tolerance becomes a moral responsibility, especially under
communitarian ideas. The final chapter will be an account of moral tolerance in American
political thought, where it will be shown how moral tolerance is conceived of by Madison and
the appearance it takes in American Constitutionalism.

PART I: TOLERANCE AND THE NATURAL LAW

Chapter 1: Locke and the Two Modes of Tolerance
Two works of John Locke give us insight into how we might tolerate divergent views in
the political community. The first, The Second Treatise of Government (henceforth substituted as
the Treatise, with citations taking the form of “S.” with the section number following [Ex.: S.6]),
provides an overview for the origins of government, and its proper roles and duties. In it, Locke
considers a “state of nature,” or a state of freedom and equality from where political
communities naturally derive (S.4). In this state of nature, no government exists, but men
nonetheless possess rights, such as the right to property. Locke further supposes that a certain
law governs this state of nature, despite there being no government to enforce it:
The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And
Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all
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equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or
Possessions (S.6).
This law of nature, which is reason itself, teaches man that certain goods exist that must, for each
individual, be protected. They are life, health, liberty, and possessions. The great challenge of the
law of nature, for Locke, is that there is no force to execute this law (S.7), or at least no one who
can execute it fairly without being a “judge in his own case” (S.13). This challenge prompts man
to leave the state of nature and of equality and to create government by contracting with others to
help enforce this law of nature (S.89). By doing so, he waives his right to enforce the law of
nature himself and instead allows an authority to do so for him (S.88). Thus, government and
civil society exist to protect the goods of life, liberty, and property.
The nature of these goods is important to note. When one thinks of what is good in life,
one may include these, but it is probably not an exhaustive list. Goods such as family,
community, vocation, and interests are goods that do not seem to fit well into Locke’s account
here. What stands out about these goods is that they are broad, and act more as a protection
against what an individual perceives as good for oneself. Liberty is good because it allows us to
choose our own way. Property is generally good, so it is imperative on the individual not to do
harm to the property of others.
These Lockean goods stand in contrast to ancient conceptions of the good, which were
more concrete. Plato, for example, conceived of contemplation as the highest good, while
Aquinas, as we shall see, prescribed goods that lead to specific action. These include family
formation, living in society, and knowledge of what is true. Against this backdrop, it is difficult
to conceive of Locke’s good as moral or normative. It prevents us from taking the life or
property of another, as well as infringing unjustly on their liberty, but it does not provide a
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positive conception of what kind of life we should pursue. This is left almost entirely up to the
individual.
The second source from which we can understand Locke’s view of tolerance and
government is A Letter Concerning Toleration (henceforth substituted as the Letter, with
citations taking the form of “L.” and the page number following [Ex.: L.6]). This work provides
a general defense for religious tolerance. While tolerance toward believers of different faiths is
not the only example of tolerance we see today, it is a useful stand-in, because all religions lay
claim to some vision of a higher good- typically one that is understood outside the bounds of
reason. The Letter provides two key insights into Lockean tolerance. First, it expounds on the
nature of goods that help establish the law of nature. Locke establishes clear walls between the
civic goods provided and protected by government and the goods provided by a church. Locke
illustrates this point by defending the act of excommunication, writing that “Excommunication
neither does, nor can, deprive the excommunicated Person of any of those Civil Goods that he
formerly possessed” (L.31). Locke is making the argument for a right to association, that any
private organization can dictate the terms upon which its members remain in good standing. By
doing so, he is also delineating the roles between the church and government.
Churches, for Locke, have a spiritual authority for their members, but not any legal
authority. Indeed, they do not even seem to have political authority. They do not exist for a
“magisterial care,” by which is meant that they do not exist “for the purpose of prescribing by
laws, and compelling by punishments.” Rather, they have a “charitable care,” which entails
“teaching, admonishing, and persuading” (L.35). For Locke, churches serve to persuade, but they
do not have a right to involve themselves institutionally in the political or legal process.
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Locke had a different attitude, when it came to the religious convictions of individuals in
the political process. Though he was against religion qua religion dictating the actions of
government, he was open to the idea of religious convictions influencing political decision
making, if those convictions were persuasive: “Although the Magistrates Opinion in Religion be
sound… yet if I be not thoroughly persuaded by thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety
for me in following it” (L.38). While Locke denies the ability of the church to provide civic
goods, he admits that the persuasive quality of religion can inform good policy making. Earlier
in the Letter, Locke admits that the magistrate, like any other man, can teach and instruct others,
through reason, for the benefit of salvation (L.27). It is true that in this instance, Locke is
describing a duty to teach others about the religious truth as one common to all, not simply to the
king. In a democratic society, however, every citizen is a sovereign who contributes to the
making of laws. It is difficult to distinguish, then, how religious individuals, who might express
their beliefs to others for the purpose of persuasion is substantively different from the church as
an institution influencing the government.
An example of this point can be seen in the state of Utah, where roughly half the
population identifies as members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Having such
a large portion of members serves to roughly align the interests of the church with the interests of
the people, but this alignment is organic, rather than manufactured intentionally. Church
leadership has little need of affecting legislation in the Utah Legislature through lobbying,
donations, or public statements when the population itself is committed to the same things as the
institution. Brown (2018), in describing the effect of the church in the Utah legislature, writes
that “More often than not… LDS leaders need not say anything at all- not publicly, and not
through their lobbyists… LDS culture alone is sufficient to produce policy outcomes favorable to

8
LDS interests” (94). A similar example might be the effect of LGBT activism in favor of samesex marriage in the United States in the years leading up the Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)
decision. Many well-funded interest groups lobbied for such a change in the law, and for a
Lockean, this fact alone would be reason for concern. But the same movement enjoyed
widespread support throughout the country, suggesting that sufficient persuasion had taken
place. Locke would likely not have objected to such a legal change on the basis of improper
authority, then.
Still, the line between large institutions with significant power and widespread sentiment
in the population seems to be more blurry than Locke is willing to admit. Churches and wellfunded interest groups have power because they persuade individuals. This would seem to make
Locke’s concern for direct religious involvement an overreaction, or even contradictory. If
churches (or other private, influential institutions) can influence individuals, and individuals can
influence government, then the claim that religious goods are separate from civic goods seems
illusory.
By erecting a wall between religious and civic goods, the Letter is suggesting a view of
tolerance that serves to protect individual interests and prevents either the church or the state
from impinging on the other. This is closer to a view of transactional tolerance, where
individuals in a society agree to establish boundaries that protect differences. Yet Locke also
seems to view tolerance as a moral imperative, one that exists for the benefit of persuasion. As
he writes in the Letter, “true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind…
And such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of any thing
by outward force” (L.27). This serves both as a justification against the use of force to compel
religious belief but is also a justification for tolerance toward those who believe differently.
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Both the Treatise and Letter serve as manuals for government for the benefit of the
people, as well as the protection of their liberty and property. They also serve as a defense of
tolerance, but they leave the reader wondering what exactly this tolerance is for. If it exists for
the mere safety of the people and the benefit of their property, then there seems to be little need
for an understanding of any other good. If it exists for a moral purpose, that is, if it exists for the
purpose of instructing individuals about the good, then individuals need to be able to define the
proper ends of their liberty and property.

Chapter 2: Natural Law and the Good
All law must be anchored in some good. When a lawmaker proposes a new law, he is, in
essence, offering up a new vision of the good. Debates about the proposed change, then, are
actually debates about whether or not this vision of the good is legitimate. The notion of a
common good, one that informs civil law, also forms the basis of natural law. At its very core,
natural law is simply an accounting of universal human goods. It is an objective measure upon
which all other laws are based, and it is obtained through reason.
The debate over competing goods can be seen in Thomas Aquinas and John Locke, each
of whom present a different combination of goods which derive the natural law. We have seen
how Locke bases natural law in the goods of life, liberty, and property. For Aquinas, “the first
precept of the natural law is that we should do and seek good, and shun evil” (Summa Theologica
I-II, Question 94, Article II [Such a citation will herein be formatted at “STI-II, 94.II”]). Here we
see a clear purpose of law, one that differs from Locke. For Aquinas, law drives men toward
what is good, while for Locke, as we have seen, it is more interested in protecting the ability to
choose the good for oneself. Aquinas further grounds natural law in three human goods: 1) self-
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preservation, 2) natural bodily inclinations (procreation, child-rearing, etc.), and 3) natural
rational inclinations to know truth (STI-II, 94.II). Aquinas offers these three precepts as
reasonable objects on which to base natural law. While natural law, for Aquinas, is man’s
participation in the eternal (God’s) law (STI-II, 91.II), it is also a just basis for civil law because
it is attained through reason (STI-II, 94.IV).
The three goods Aquinas gives as a basis for natural law share a common feature: they
are all moral goods that direct one toward specific actions. Pursuing the human good of
procreation leads to procreation. Likewise, pursuing one’s natural inclinations to know truth will
lead one to seek out what is true. Acceptance of these goods, then, dictate how both
governments, and their citizens, should act. This makes them moral goods, or virtues, that belong
to the natural and civil law. Aquinas saw a connection between law and virtue, in that one always
cultivated the other.
Both Locke and Aquinas understood the need of natural law to be accessible through
reason. For Aquinas, this need comes from the nature of man as an intelligent being, capable of
understanding the good through reason: “Person signifies what is most perfect in all nature- that
is a subsistent individual of rational nature” (STI-II, 29.III). This is Aquinas’ conception of
human dignity, that every person carries within them a rational capability that is not present in
other beings. Knasas (2011) connects this notion of human dignity with the first of the three
precepts listed by Aquinas in STI-II, 94.II, which in the text of the Summa reads “human beings
have inclination for good by the nature they share with all substances… And regarding this
inclination, means that preserve our human life and prevent the contrary belong to the natural
law” (14). As Knasas correctly identifies, this first practical principle of natural law is, in
essence, a call to love. The idea that we are rational by nature, and that this rationality should
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lead us to have a universal affection for our neighbors is what Knasas refers to as “fraternal
tolerance” (2011, 6). Fraternal tolerance recognizes the status of each person as intelligencers of
the common good. It is not different from moral tolerance but describing this form of tolerance
as moral helps us understand that it is a duty of the individual to extend this tolerance to others.
The claim that tolerance is supported by the writings of Aquinas might seem, for many, a
suspect one. Aquinas, after all, is one of the chief philosophers of natural law, which makes a
claim on the civil law in favor of a specific notion of the good. This notion of the good, of
course, also happens to align closely with Christian teachings and especially those of the
Catholic Church. A review of what Aquinas actually wrote on tolerance, however, should clarify
this view of Aquinas. We will see that what he was committed to in his writings was a consistent
adherence to reason, one that can operate regardless of one’s personal commitment to Christian
teaching.
Aquinas writes of tolerance in the Summa, and like Locke, does so in the context of
religious tolerance. There is an important difference in how each approaches religious tolerance,
however. While Locke writes of how governments ought to tolerate religion, Aquinas is
concerned with how religions (and the Catholic faith in particular) should tolerate other religions,
as well as those who apostatize. Aquinas likely wrote this way because in his day, there was so
much religious influence in government that a distinction between the two would not have been
helpful. Still, Aquinas could have argued of the theoretical importance of such a distinction, yet
he did not. It is worth noting Aquinas’ treatment of tolerance as an issue for religious believers,
then, because it gives us a hint at how his view of toleration will differ from Locke’s. Recall how
Locke struggled in the Letter to distinguish between seeing tolerance as a wall created by
government around civic goods and seeing tolerance as a moral imperative for the purpose of
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persuasion. By extending tolerance to both the state and the church, he is suggesting that each are
capable of providing and protecting human goods. In short, Aquinas is making no doubt about
which mode of tolerance he prefers.
Aquinas’ writings on tolerance are primarily questions of how the church should treat
unbelievers and heretics. When considering if unbelievers can be compelled to accept the faith,
Aquinas only extends the compelling of faith to those who have previously accepted it (STII-II,
10.XIII). Tolerance is then extended to those who have not accepted the faith because, “to
believe depends on the will” (STII-II, 10.XIII). We better understand Aquinas’ view when taking
up the question of how heretics should be tolerated. Aquinas is adamant in claiming that heresy
in the Church should not be tolerated, but nonetheless, the treatment of heretics should be
carefully considered after giving them adequate chance to absolve themselves (STII-II, 11.III). It
is difficult to consider such positions as tolerant, but that does not mean that Aquinas held a
generally intolerant view. As we shall see, Aquinas believed that law cultivated virtue by
dissuading bad behavior and by considering the dictates of reason (STI-II, 92.I; STI-II, 63).
Aquinas’ narrow application of tolerance here speaks to his use of prudence in toleration. The
goal was the creation of virtuous citizens through law, and tolerance was applied only when it
assisted the individual in employing reason. To compel Jews or other nonbelievers to his view
would have 1) contradicted his own view of all men being intelligent beings capable of
recognizing and choosing the good and 2) would have actually deprived others of the opportunity
to choose the good. Those who have already come to an understanding of the good, but then
rejected it, however, are acting outside the bounds of reason. For Aquinas, this provides an
adequate reason for substituting tolerance for compulsion.
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PART II: TRANSACTIONAL TOLERANCE: A MODERN CONCESSION

Chapter 3: What is Tolerance?
Tolerance is an uncomfortable, but often misunderstood, subject in political rhetoric. To
clarify what is meant by tolerance, it is helpful to provide a clear definition from the start:
tolerance is the acceptance of behaviors or beliefs that we deem morally wrong into the political
community. By this definition, tolerance does not deal with the acceptance of people as such,
only the acceptance of their behavior or beliefs. Accepting other people as people should be
understood as distinct from accepting morally wrong behaviors and beliefs. When one accepts
the personhood of another, there is no moral conflict inherent in that choice. One may still hate
that person because they are different in some other way, but the essence of the choice was to
recognize a similarity between the two, not a difference. Thus, there is no inherent conflict in
recognizing someone else’s personhood, even if conflict nonetheless arises. When one accepts
the behavior or beliefs of another, despite moral difference, there is inherent conflict. The
essence of this choice is the recognition of moral difference and granting acceptance despite it.
This conflict, always present in tolerance, is what best defines it.
We can apply this definition of tolerance to various examples in history. During the Civil
Rights movement, for example, the question was not “Should whites tolerate African
Americans?”, because African Americans were asking to be treated equally, not as something
morally distinct from whites. The question, instead, was “Should we tolerate the unequal
treatment of African Americans by whites?”. Most would agree that the United States answered
“no” to this question, because unequal treatment was deemed so morally undesirable.
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There is still a great deal of confusion about tolerance, even when limited to the
definition above. Toleration is not endorsement. Any belief or behavior that one believes to be
good, or at least morally neutral, cannot be tolerated by that person. Likewise, toleration is not
necessarily indifference. When one chooses to tolerate something one believes to be wrong, one
is merely making a political or legal decision. While this decision to tolerate is not without moral
significance, it is not contradictory to also oppose the tolerated action or belief in other contexts.
Joseph Raz highlights this feature of tolerance in his own definition by pointing out that, “one is
tolerant only if one inclines or is tempted not to be” (403). Raz goes on to describe why the
personal convictions of the tolerant person are crucial in identifying tolerance, because, as was
discussed earlier, conflict is the essence of tolerance. By its nature, tolerance acts against one set
of inclinations, but in favor of another. We will return to the idea of competing inclinations with
ourselves, but first, it is important to understand and lay out what tolerance looks like in practice.
Tolerance usually takes two forms in law. Examples of each of these forms can be seen in
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The first form of tolerance, seen in the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, is the permitting of all forms of
expression. By allowing everyone to express what they believe to be true, the law grants a
blanket form of tolerance to all. This creates a pluralistic society, where different ideas can
compete for attention. The hope in such a society is that the truth will, over time, be sifted out
like wheat from chaff. Still, governments often use the force of law to grant advantages to certain
ideas over others. The second form of tolerance, then, is the granting of equal legitimacy to all
beliefs regarding a certain object. This can be seen in the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, where Congress is prohibited from offering greater legitimacy to one religion by
making it a state religion.
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Freedom of expression, as well as freedom from coerced expression, are legal forms of
tolerance that test two competing desires. The first is a desire to promulgate the good. The good
here should be understood in the same way that Aquinas meant it, meaning that what is good is
no different than what is true. We all have a desire to uphold the truth, at least as we understand
it. A more cynical understanding of this first desire, expressed by T.M. Scanlon, is “[t]he desire
to prevent those with whom one disagrees from influencing the evolution of one’s society”
(229). This description speaks less of preserving what is true and more to preserving personal
preferences.
This cynical interpretation of the first desire in tolerance does not respond to the claim by
Aquinas (and Locke, for that matter) that good is understandable through reason. While some
may act on personal preference over reason, it is the duty of lawmakers to treat reason
authoritatively. While many philosophers, including Scanlon, likely have other objections to
Aquinas’ claim, it is the goal of this thesis to make a moral case for tolerance based on the
understanding of natural law laid out by Aquinas. Thus, responding to these objections would be
outside the scope here.
The second objection, in conflict with our desire to promulgate the good, can itself take
two distinct forms. Each form of this second desire represents a distinct form of tolerance. The
first desire, which is a component in the Lockean understanding of tolerance, is the desire for
political stability. Moral disagreements are typically fueled with passion and can have the effect
of tearing a political community apart.
After the acquittal of three police officers for using excessive force against Rodney King
in 1992, Los Angeles erupted into riots. King, who was black, was seen as a victim of racial
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discrimination, while the white officers benefitted from their race. While being interviewed on
television, King famously implored
I just want to say – you know – can we, can we all get along? Can we, can we get along?
Can we stop making it horrible for the older people and the kids? And ... I mean we've got
enough smog in Los Angeles let alone to deal with setting these fires and things ... It's just
not right. It's not right, and it's not going to change anything. We'll get our justice. They've
won the battle, but they haven't won the war.
While it is hard to know all of King’s motivations, it is clear that King is emphasizing his desire
for peace over any desire he has to express the pains of racial injustice. It is easy to imagine the
rioters disagreeing with King’s request, on the grounds that a message had to be sent to the
leaders of the City of Los Angeles and that prioritizing peace would compromise their ability to
send this message.
The desire for order and peace, famously expressed by Rodney King, is seen throughout
Locke’s writings as well. Writing of the subordination of powers, Locke declares “Salus Populi
Suprema Lex,” or, “The safety of the people is the highest law,” as an unerring principle (S.158).
At the end of the Letter, Locke makes his case for religious tolerance on the grounds of
preventing “Seditious Commotions” on account of oppression being its primary catalyst (L.52).
In this chapter, we will continue to discuss this desire and how it shapes tolerance. First,
however, we must also introduce the alternative to this desire.
While few would deny they desire peace and order in their political communities, this is
not always their priority, nor is it the desire that conflicts with the good when adopting tolerant
views. Another desire, then, is for one’s neighbors and countrymen to be free of coercion when
choosing the good. If coercion negatively affects how an individual understands the good, then
coercion, including legal coercion, is undesirable in a political community. This conflicts with
our desire to promulgate what is good through law, as no law is without coercion. Recall how
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Aquinas conceived man as an intelligent being, capable of understanding the good and true
through reason. At first glance, legal coercion, and natural law itself, would appear to be in
conflict with a desire for others to choose the good. More clarity to this question will be given in
Part III, but for now, suffice it to say that balancing these two concerns is that act of moral
tolerance, properly understood. It is the job of political leaders to use prudence in applying both
the dictates of natural law and the need for free choice.
Emphasizing tolerance for its own sake comes at a cost. Doing so kicks moral questions
down the road, thereby amplifying the moral debates inherent in politics. This can be seen in the
passive-aggressive husband and wife, who refuse to acknowledge the disagreements they have
and instead keep their true feelings hidden behind a veneer of pleasantness. Rather than facing
the issues they have, resentment and anger build up until a tipping point is reached. This tipping
point, characterized by extreme emotion and anger, is when both sides abandon the desire for
peace and instead prioritize what they, in that moment, deem to be true. Pursuing tolerance for
the sake of political order works much the same way. If a husband and wife who refuse to
acknowledge strife in their relationship are at risk of losing control, it is reasonable to suppose
that different political factions who refuse to acknowledge their moral disagreements are at a
similar risk.
When tolerance is pursued for the sake of political order or peace, a transactional
relationship is formed between the parties in disagreement. Each side agrees to the terms of a
truce, enjoying a certain amount of space to live freely each while also agreeing to not disturb the
space of the other side. It is appropriate, then, to label this form of tolerance “transactional
tolerance,” or tolerance that is pursued for the sake of political order or peace.

18
None of this is to suggest that seeking peace and order are undesirable. Rather, it is to say
that transactional tolerance is a stop-gap measure. As tolerance becomes more necessary in a
modern and diverse world, political leaders will be tempted to abandon moral deliberation
around the good and instead settle for tolerance that comes simply out of political expediency.
We now turn to discuss what transactional tolerance looks like in a democratized society.

Chapter 4: Democracy and the Rise of Informal Politics
Democracy, with its effect on human institutions, changes what we view as political. We
typically understand the activity of politics to be things like running for office, debating in
legislatures, and advocating for issues in front of elected officials. We also may think of
discussing and debating politics with friends or peers in public places. This is a narrow view of
politics, one that focuses on the actions and beliefs of elected officials. It is also what Scanlon
(1996) calls “formal politics,” or the type of politics that is most explicit (229). When trying to
understand tolerance, we often limit our observations to this form, without acknowledging the
politics that happens outside of government and elections. Scanlon refers to this as “informal
politics,” or the kind of politics that occurs between private individuals and entities (229). While
the relationship between a church and the state is a question of formal politics, the relationship
between one church and another church is an example of informal politics. Less intuitive
examples of informal politics include the frustration of seeing a pickup truck bearing the flag of a
political opponent or a bumper sticker with a snide political remark. We also see informal
politics in the frustrating office politics we see in many workplaces. The desire to wield power
and influence does not vanish at the doorway of Congress or the White House.
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This is an important concept in modern life, as democratized institutions have led to an
increase in informal politics. One example of this is the evolution of the “town square.” There
was a time where public debates were had primarily in public places, like a town square.
Typically, this was a public space in both the colloquial and legal sense. It was public property,
meaning that in the American context, speech on the property was protected under the First
Amendment. It was also public in the colloquial sense, in that everyone was welcome and people
from a variety of classes and backgrounds could be found there. As technology improved, the
forum for these debates changed. Debates in the town square eventually moved to newspapers
and radio, which were able to publish and broadcast messages to thousands at a time. Television
also became a new forum for debate. These forms of media, unlike the town square, were
private, but still subject to regulation. The Fairness Doctrine, a rule administered by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) that required broadcasters to provide equal time to
differing points of view, was one such regulation. Then public debates were democratized by the
internet, where anyone could participate in debates, first through blogs, then through social
media. To the extent that there is any regulation of speech on the internet, it is decided and
enforced almost exclusively by private corporations. While public town squares do still exist, the
attraction to the private spaces for debate is so alluring, it seems as though these public town
squares do not matter anymore.
This transition from public town squares to private online forums is one example of the
proliferation of informal politics. While legal demands for tolerance are not typically present in
informal politics, it is still politics. Debates over what is good for society still take place in these
private settings, but the tolerance offered by most democratic governments is not always present.
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This is justified by the fact that government’s use of force is absent in informal politics, and
tolerance by government is the only tolerance necessary.
We see this debate play out between social media companies and individuals that have
been banned from their platforms. In 2021, Twitter banned former president Donald Trump, after
it determined that Trump had violated its User Policies. Setting aside the legal arguments about
whether or not Trump had, in fact, violated terms he agreed to, there is no argument that Trump
violated the very narrow standards for speech regulation allowable by government. If Twitter
were a public entity, it would clearly be in violation of the First Amendment. What Twitter, and
advocates of limited internet regulation instead argue, is that forcing them to be tolerant of what
they believe to be misleading and wrong is actually a type of intolerance directed at them. The
difference, according to defenders of Twitter, is that this intolerance would come from the
government. While the worst Twitter can do is remove you from a time-wasting social media
platform, the government, with its monopoly on violence, has the power to do a great deal more.
Donald Trump, and many of his supporters, have responded by pointing out that Twitter is
indeed part of the public square in the colloquial sense, even if it is not legally. They also have
concern for how other corporations like banks, who provide services more necessary to everyday
life, might tolerate views they deem problematic.
The point here is not to make an argument for or against increased internet regulation.
Rather, it is to point out that debates over tolerance linger, and even become more complex,
when societies transition from formal to informal politics. In the world of formal politics, where
government is a direct actor, we can argue for tolerance because the alternative will inevitably
involve the use of force. This argument for tolerance is not available in the context of informal
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politics, so it is helpful to distinguish between these two forms of politics when trying to identify
the justifications for tolerance in a democratic society.
This is one way in which the rule of law becomes an important concept in seemingly
tolerant societies. Weber (1946) defined the state as a political institution with a monopoly on the
legitimate use of violence (78), and an interest in maintaining this monopoly exists regardless of
whether or not a state is interested in pluralism. This monopoly on the legitimate use of violence
is how governments establish the rule of law, though many are unsuccessful or uninterested in
doing so. By applying the law equally to all citizens in a society, each person knows that
contracts will be enforced, and that unjustified violence will be punished. This has enormous
benefits for a free society. It does not, however, change the way we think and speak about those
who are different from us. If tolerance is something we need for peace, then it becomes obsolete
when peace is promised from another source. We may still benefit from the rule of law, but we
have no need to confront the moral differences of our neighbors.
Here we see the relationship between informal politics and transactional tolerance. In the
world of informal politics, there seems to be less need for tolerance, if our understanding of
tolerance is limited to transactional tolerance. Peace is already assured in private interactions
because violent force is prohibited by the rule of law. Thus, there is little outside incentive for
tolerance in wholly private interactions. Certainly, manners and the norms of polite society still
compel us to treat others with a base level of respect, but these norms become weaker within
interactions between impersonal or corporate entities. One simply needs to spend a few minutes
on Twitter, or any other social media platform where politics are discussed, to see that politeness
and decency vanish in the context of impersonal communication.
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In the world of informal politics, tolerance erodes when we think of it as merely a tool for
compromise and order. This is especially true in a strong and democratic state, where peace is
ensured between private parties through the rule of law. This gives one little incentive to directly
confront the moral differences of one’s neighbor. The difficulty in confronting political
differences, and the moral differences inherent to them, lead many to see politics as something
not to be discussed at the dinner table, workplace, and other locations that might include those
with a variety of beliefs and opinions. As we become more insulated from difference, it becomes
easy to avoid difference altogether. The increased political polarization of recent decades
(Fischer & Mattson 2009, Liu & Srivastava 2015, Vann 2021) suggests that few have need to
confront the moral or political differences of others. If the essence of tolerance is the acceptance
of difference, it is reasonable to assume that a country that is becoming less and less amenable to
difference is likewise becoming less and less tolerant.
Meanwhile, the areas of life designed to be tolerant to the free exchange of ideas are
under threat. One such area, the university campus, is under particular threat, as fewer and fewer
college students accept the ideas of free speech and free expression. As Haidt and Lukianoff
(2018) document, the college campus is becoming a hostile place for free speech. This hostility
is not just from students and faculty, who organize disruptive protests demanding controversial
speakers be disinvited, but also from administration, who often comply with these requests. This
is notable in the case of public university campuses, where the First Amendment protects such
speech.
This chapter has attempted to describe the result of three conditions in a democratic
society: 1) the public understanding of tolerance as something for the sake of peace and order, 2)
a rise in informal politics, where much of moral and political life happens outside of the purview
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of the state, and 3) the rule of law, where violence is heavily regulated by the state. It is the goal
of this chapter to show how these three conditions erode tolerance in practice. Most examples of
this intolerance are outside the legal framework of tolerance set forth in American Constitutional
law. It is not unconstitutional or illegal, for example, for political adherents to sort themselves
geographically and culturally.
Public universities refusing to grant First Amendment protections to speakers on their
campuses, however, may be acting in violation of the legal framework of tolerance. This
suggests that a legal framework of tolerance, exemplified by the First Amendment and
elsewhere, may be under threat under the three conditions listed above. When Locke considered
liberty to be a good of the law of nature, and that government must tolerate differing views to
uphold this good, it is tempting to assume that a state willing to act as a neutral arbiter in the
private affairs of its citizens would be sufficient to secure this good. Yet we have seen how this
conception of neutrality, where tolerance is only necessary for governments, undermines liberty
as a good in itself.
To rectify the condition described in this chapter, one of the three preconditions must be
altered. To alter the last of these three, the rule of law, would be a remedy worse than the
disease, so it is unavailable. The second precondition, the rise in informal politics, is due in large
part to the rise of democracy. This makes eliminating it an unwieldy goal, as society becomes
ever more complex and egalitarian. That leaves us to alter the first precondition, a public
understanding of tolerance as something for the sake of peace and order. If tolerance was
understood to be something more than a truce between different parties, it might help us
understand the need to confront differences with those who are different. It would give us space
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to engage in moral deliberation with our neighbors and fellow citizens, something that is
necessary in a democracy where we all must find a way to live together.

PART III: MORAL TOLERANCE: A NECESSARY CONCESSION

Chapter 5: Transactional Tolerance and Moral Deliberation
After World War II, Dwight Eisenhower served briefly as president of Columbia
University. During his time there, the campus was undergoing extensive growth and part of this
growth was the construction of a new system of sidewalks. A story is told of the process by
which these new sidewalks were designed; and while it is not clear that the story is true, it is a
helpful parable for understanding different methods by which law should be formed. As the story
goes, Eisenhower was presented with two different plans for where the sidewalks should be laid.
Rather than choose one over the other, Eisenhower had grass planted throughout campus and
then gave permission for students to trample paths through the grass. As these paths emerged,
sidewalks were simply paved over them. According to the story, neither of the two plans
matched the paths trampled out by the students.
This story has been told (Goldberg 2018, Williamson 2011) as a critique of central
planning, or the handing down of law and policy by a strong, centralized power. It argues that
individuals allowed to act in their own self-interest will collectively communicate what laws
should be made (or, in the case of the story, where sidewalks should be paved). This certainly
may be true in certain contexts, like as a way to promote economic dynamism and allow the
invisible hand to drive innovation and growth. Where it is less clear is when this claim is made
as an argument against the mixing of law and morals generally. According to this claim, debates
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over moral goods are unnecessary, because the aggregation of individual preferences can steer us
toward the common good. Individual moral preferences will bear out in the cultural milieu and
outside of civic or political discourse. We then elect legislators who mirror these aggregate
preferences and write them into law. Civic engagement can be limited to voting for these elected
leaders and occasionally participating in some large-scale activism and protest.
This chapter will challenge this claim of law without moral deliberation, by showing how
moral deliberation is bound up in the democratic process. It will then seek to establish a
relationship between transactional tolerance and politics bereft of moral deliberation. We have
already seen this to some extent, when describing the analogy of a married couple who refuse to
confront the challenges they face head-on. Understanding this relationship is important, as it sets
out one of the primary claims of this thesis: that tolerance for the purpose of moral deliberation is
advantageous to democracy and the upholding of the natural law. Tolerance for any other
purpose actually has the effect of undermining both. Finally, this chapter will introduce moral
tolerance, which, as an alternative to transactional tolerance, allows moral deliberation to
flourish.
To understand moral deliberation, and how it is being used in this context, it is helpful to
reference the writings of three philosophers. The first, whose work is already a main focus of this
thesis, is Thomas Aquinas. As we have seen, Aquinas bases natural law in the good. He also
understood humans as intelligent beings, who can understand the good through theoretical
reason, and then how to pursue the good through practical reason. For Aquinas, this was not an
individual endeavor, but a social one. Taking the lead from Aristotle, Aquinas saw man as a
political animal with sense perception of good and evil (1253a 2–15). Indeed, living in a political
community was itself a good for Aquinas, and law should reflect that good.
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The other two, more recent, accounts of moral deliberation come from Alexis de
Tocqueville and Michael Sandel. Tocqueville, in Democracy in America, speaks of American
republicanism. By this he means a respect for mores, law, and freedom simultaneously.
Tocqueville does not deny that these three things can be in conflict with each other. It is, in fact,
the prudential balancing of these things that define a republican conception of politics. In his
own words, Tocqueville defines the American republic
as the slow and quiet action of society upon itself. It is an orderly state really founded on
the enlightened will of the people. It is a conciliatory government under which
resolutions have time to ripen, being discussed with deliberation and executed only when
mature. (362)
This account of deliberation almost sounds utopian, but Tocqueville stresses that in reality, it is
very natural. Indeed, there is in some way, very little that is remarkable about it. Earlier in the
account, he offers another description of the typical man from New England:
He takes a part in every occurrence in the place; he practices the art of government in the
small sphere within his reach; he accustoms himself to those forms without which liberty
can only advance by revolutions; he imbibes their spirit; he acquires a taste for order,
comprehends the balance of powers, and collects clear practical notions on the nature of
his duties and the extent of his rights. (68)
What Tocqueville offers here is a description of both a self-reflective, but also outwardly
concerned man.
This social and republican understanding of politics is expounded upon by Sandel (2005),
whose concern for a deracinated political culture caused him to reflect on civic participation in
politics. In describing a republican conception of political engagement, he writes that
According to republican political theory… sharing in self-rule involves something more.
It involves deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to shape
the destiny of the political community. But to deliberate well about the common good
requires more than the capacity to choose one’s ends and to respect others’ rights to do
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the same. It requires a knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, and
concern for the whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake. (10)
Here, Sandel is criticizing the idea that one can have their own preferences, but never need to
consider the preferences of others, provided different preferences tolerate each other. Rather,
Sandel is claiming a social responsibility to establish a “moral bond” with one’s community.
These three accounts all describe aspects of moral deliberation. It is the act of
contemplating goods on a social and political scale. For Aquinas and Sandel, it centers primarily
on morality, while Tocqueville seems more concerned with mores. Tocqueville and Sandel
consider it a republican virtue, while Aquinas seems to consider it politics, rightly understood.
These differences are not unimportant, but the similarities all point to a community engaged in
public deliberation over the meaning of the good life.
Moral deliberation in a democracy is difficult, as demonstrated by Plato in the Republic.
Socrates differentiates regimes based on what each regime values most and orders them from
most to least desirable. The highest regime, aristocracy, is the regime that most values wisdom
and is ruled by a philosopher-king, capable of knowing the common good and administering it
through law. As a regime devolves based on what it loves, it will eventually transform into a
democracy, which most values freedom.
Plato’s account of democracy in the Republic shows us why deliberation is a difficult, but
necessary condition for democracy. Socrates refers to democracy as the “fairest” of all regimes,
because a variety of beliefs, practices, and values are able to thrive within it (557c). While
Socrates does not use the word tolerance, the idea is certainly what he meant. According to
Socrates, this virtue of democracy contains within it a fatal flaw, one that should sound familiar
to the reader at this point. In describing the democratic man, Socrates describes him as one who
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doesn’t admit true speech or let it pass into the guardhouse, if someone says that there are
some pleasures belonging to fine and good desires and some belonging to bad desires,
and that the ones must be practiced and honored and the others checked and enslaved.
Rather, he shakes his head at all this and says that all are alike and must be honored on an
equal basis. (561b-c)
Socrates’ account of the democratic man echoes the earlier account of transactional tolerance.
With freedom as the end of the democratic regime, as opposed to wisdom and the good, moral
deliberation appears unnecessary. What Socrates’ democratic man misses is that the democracy
which refuses to acknowledge one vision of the good above another is still acknowledging
democracy, equality, and tolerance as objective goods nonetheless (Talisse 2005, 100; Estlund
1997, 183). The democratic man, then, is making a claim about the good, even if he insists he is
not.
Plato and Aquinas both provide accounts of moral deliberation that are not democratic.
The aristocratic regime and Aquinas’ account of tolerance, which was discussed in the first part
of this thesis, are accounts of moral deliberation that are centralized to a noble few. Yet
democracy is the necessary condition of government today, where large and diverse populations
live together in equality. This equality, and by extension, tolerance, cannot thrive under
democracy, when this tolerance is pursued for its own sake. Democracies that do thrive in
concert with moral deliberation, however, do so with reason being the basis of the law, rather
than power. Aquinas would have agreed with Socrates’ response to Thrasymachus in the
Republic, who claimed that justice was merely the advantage of the stronger (338c). He likewise
would agree with Jaffa (1982), who claimed that Thrasymachus’ description of justice mirrors
Stephen Douglas’ understanding of democracy in the Lincoln Douglas Debates. Jaffa contrasts
Lincoln’s understanding of democracy, one that was republican in nature, with Douglas’, who
understood democratic authority as simply the sum of personal preferences.
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The idea that political deliberation has no epistemic role but is simply the assemblage of
personal preferences has been identified by some scholars as “proceduralism” (Talisse 2005,
101; Estlund 1997, 176). Estlund (1997) is critical of proceduralism, pointing out that when
deciding between two preferences, flipping a coin is the fairest method for choosing one over the
other (176). Yet there is still a reason we reject lawmaking by coin flip as undemocratic. The
essence of democracy is that law is made by the voice of the people, but this is not how
democracy typically functions in practice. Recall the students who trampled paths through the
grass at Columbia. It is unlikely that a vote or public hearings, procedures that suggest some type
of deliberation, were held by the students about where they would create these paths. Whether
this procedural democracy is simply the power of the loudest, strongest voices (as Jaffa would
argue) or an incoherent claim about fairness that undermines itself (as Talisse and Estlund would
argue), it must have a culture of moral deliberation to overcome its failings.
Transactional tolerance undermines this morally deliberative culture. Just as Socrates’
democratic man refuses to acknowledge the good, out of fear of disturbing equality, transactional
tolerance refuses to acknowledge good out of fear of disrupting political order and peace. Yet as
we have seen, democracy can only be sustained by the acknowledgement of the good. This idea,
that democracy must be morally deliberative, raises questions about equality under such a
democracy. If it is the duty of each individual, in a morally deliberative democracy, to invoke
their understanding of the good into politics, it seems a contradiction to claim such a democracy
has achieved equality.
This criticism misses the fundamental purpose for moral deliberation: that because each
person possesses the ability to comprehend the good, each person must have the opportunity to
come to this realization. Silencing dissent on the basis of it being opposed to the good is not
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moral deliberation. It also is the justification for a second, more deliberative, form of tolerance
that is applied for the purpose of giving others space to choose the good life. It relies on the
assumption that moral goods must be chosen. This follows the claim of Aquinas, that man is an
intelligent being capable of reasoning about the good.
Here we see the synthesis between a democratic and free society, and one of moral
deliberation committed to applying the ideas of the good life into law. In this synthesis,
democracy exists as a means for moral deliberation, rather than an end in itself. It rejects Plato’s
democratic man, who insists that all ideas are equal. Still, it uses prudence to identify which
ideas, though wrong, are still worthy of public debate and consideration. A morally deliberative
society does this because it has concluded that all individuals are intelligent beings, and as such,
are worth persuading rather than coercing.

Chapter 6: Do We Owe Tolerance to Our Neighbors?
Political philosophy is replete with theories of what individuals owe each other in the
political community. When considering tolerance, it is worth asking what theories include
tolerance as a moral imperative, and if that inclusion is justified. For the purpose of brevity, only
two theories of civic obligation will be discussed here: that of Locke and of the communitarian
philosophers Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel. For Locke, conjugal society and political
society were not parallels of the same idea, but a succession. Conjugal society was pre-political
and existed for the purpose of preparing the individual for political society. As he wrote in the
Second Treatise “the power of a magistrate over a subject, may be distinguished from that of a
father of his children, a master over his servant, a husband over his wife, and a lord over his
slave” (S.2). Locke is doing this as a way to push against claims of the divine right of kings, but
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he is also signaling that the contrasts between conjugal and political society are more important
than the similarities (Pfeffer 2001, 597-98). This will continue to bear out, as we see a didactic
end for conjugal society and a protective and peace-ensuring end for political society.
In conjugal society, parents have a “duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of
their off-spring, during the imperfect state of childhood” (S.58). The imperfection Locke is
referring to is the absence of reason, and the duties are simply to cultivate the ability to reason in
their children. Here, Locke admits an inequality of a certain type between parents and children,
the latter of which “are not born in this full state of equality, though they are born to it” (S.55).
The latent, but not realized, capacity for reason in children implies a duty of the parent. As
children learn to reason, they begin to have a capacity to understand the law, and the duty of the
parent wanes: “The bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling clothes they are wrapped up
in, and supported by, in the weakness of their Infancy. Age and reason as they grow up, loosen
them till at length they drop quite off” (S.55). When this happens, it is not only the bond between
parent and child that disappears, but also the bond between husband and wife (S.81). This
account of family would appear to be completely individualistic, as it seems to place the fewest
duties upon anyone at any given time. Still, it provides an account of families that prepare
individuals for participation in political society (Pfeffer 2001, 599). The contractual relationship
that served a didactic purpose allowed those in it to engage in another contract: that of political
society.
Locke’s account of the origins of political society contrast with his account of conjugal
society. Where conjugal society was based on responsibility, political society is based on
consent. This is not to say that consent was absent in Locke’s conjugal society, but the primary
governing principle was the responsibility that parents owed their children. In political society,
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man consents to give up certain rights for the enjoyment of certain property (S.95). This consent
to join in government with others, however, places obligations on the individual that serve to the
benefit of the majority: “And thus every Man, by consenting with others to make one body
politic… puts himself under an obligation to every one of the society, to submit to the
determination of the majority” (S.97). As Locke expands on his theory of government, with an
authoritative legislature (S.135) and an executive whose prerogative is limited to the interests of
the many (S.160), we see that the agreement by the individual to live and participate in society
places obligations upon the individual for the good of the many.
In the Treatise and again in the Letter, Locke proposes a variety of duties, of which
tolerance is one. Using S.6 of the Treatise, Simmons (1992), identifies four categories of duty, or
“natural obligation” (S.118), for every person in a political society. They are 1) duties to preserve
oneself, 2) duties to preserve others, 3) duties not to take the life of another, and 4) duties not to
interfere with or destroy another’s property or liberty (60). This list aligns with the list of goods
mentioned in S.6, but close scrutiny reveals more political obligations than one may realize
would come with Locke. For example, the first obligation might justify prohibitions on smoking
and other practices harmful to one’s health. Yet this would seem to violate the right we have to
dispose of our property the way we see fit (S.190). Kilcullen (1983) explains discrepancies like
this by pointing out that the Treatise is not merely an account of all political obligations under
government of consent. Rather, it shows the limits of how a consent-based government can
oblige its citizens.
The Letter provides a little more clarity on the responsibilities of individuals with regard
to tolerance. Throughout the work, Locke even describes a “Duty of Toleration,” though this
term is used to describe the duty of government, not the individual (L.30-36). Still, there seem to

33
be personal obligations for Christians related to tolerance in the Letter. Early on, Locke writes
that conversion through compulsion violates the Christian duty for persuasion:
For if it be out of a principle of charity, as they pretend, and love to men’s souls, that they
deprive them of their estates, maim them with corporal punishments, starve and torment
them in noisome prisons, and in the end even take away their lives; I say, if all this be
done merely to make men Christians, and procure their salvation, why then do they suffer
whoredom, fraud, malice, and such like enormities…? These, and such like things, are
certainly more contrary to the Glory of God… and to the salvation of souls, than any
conscientious dissent from ecclesiastical decisions. (L.24)
It is possible that Locke is hinting at the perceived intolerance of the Catholic Church toward
unbelievers and heretics. He may even be taking aim at Aquinas who, as we discussed earlier,
supported outright intolerance toward heretics in the Summa. Whether or not this is a reference to
Catholic or Thomistic intolerance, however, distracts from the larger claim Locke is making.
Human nature is such that man is capable of choosing what is good, and that ability to choose
places a duty upon other individuals. This is something that aligns both with the Thomistic
conception of human nature and Locke’s conception of goods in the state of nature.
Locke’s two societies, the conjugal and political, succeed at establishing a government
where property can be enjoyed, while providing its continuation through the family. It also
places responsibilities on the individual, including obligation toward one’s fellow citizens. As
mentioned earlier, responsibility is the very basis of Locke’s conjugal society. A parent has
responsibilities toward their child and, for a time, toward their spouse. There are also
responsibilities in Locke’s political society that derive from each individual’s right to liberty.
Locke’s more individualist theory of citizenship contrasts with more communitarian
conceptions. One such conception is that of Alasdair MacIntyre, who conceived of natural duties
as a function of living in society in his book After Virtue. While Locke conceived of duties as
contractual obligations, MacIntyre envisioned something more teleological. According to this
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conception, the individual is not merely born “to a state of equality,” but born into a larger whole
that is unique to them. This includes family, but it also includes city, nation, religious tradition,
and other unchosen “narratives.” As MacIntyre puts it “We enter human society, that is, with one
or more imputed characters- roles into which we have been drafted- and we have to learn what
they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us” (1981, 201). Man, for
MacIntyre, is “a teller of stories that aspire to truth” and so must understand the story he is born
into, before he can determine which path he is to take (1981, 201).
The encumbrances in Locke and MacIntyre’s accounts differ in both degree and kind.
While it is true that MacIntyre envisioned far more obligations than Locke, he also envisioned
more non-contractual obligations. These are unchosen bonds that we are simply born into or are
otherwise thrust upon us. Sandel (1982) offers additional insight into the conception of the
person as having multiple, unchosen encumbrances. As part of his response to another
individualist political philosopher, John Rawls, Sandel considers the “intersubjective”
conception of the person, one that contains “a plurality of selves within a single, individual
human being.” A single individual, may, within oneself, contain contradictions (62-3). This may
be the person who wants to eat healthy but cannot resist pastries. It is the father who wants to
spend more time with his kids, but also cannot separate himself from work. Sandel is making the
case that Rawls incorrectly rejects this conception of a complex human being, one with multiple,
even competing, commitments and interests. While Locke does not necessarily reject such a
notion, the assumptions behind transactional tolerance do.
It is tempting to suppose that moral and transactional tolerance are only differences in
attitude, not differences in practice. This concern has been addressed elsewhere in this thesis (see
Chapter 5 on the importance of moral deliberation), but MacIntyre and Sandel provide an
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additional reason for why this is not so. Transactional tolerance seeks peace and order, and in
doing so, comes to disregard the moral claims of those who are different. Put simply,
transactional tolerance invokes no requirement for the individual to take seriously the moral
claims of his or her neighbor. If, however, humans are complex by nature and contain within
them competing obligations and interests, then disregarding the moral commitments of others
ignores the moral contradictions we ourselves face.
Humans, like tolerance itself, are inherently contradictory. They believe things that
contradict their behavior or even other stated beliefs. This makes the application of transactional
tolerance difficult because transactional tolerance assumes that a wall can exist between our
moral beliefs and the practical concerns of government. Take, for example, the Civil Rights
movement in the United States during the latter half of the twentieth century. As was stated in
Chapter 3, the Civil Rights Movement was a question of whether or not the country at-large
should tolerate white supremacy. For years, the country avoided the moral deliberation necessary
to answer this question. When, in 1954, Brown v. Board of Education required public schools to
desegregate by race, many southern states and municipalities resisted. In 1957, Arkansas
Governor Orval Faubus ordered that Little Rock Central High School not comply with the order
from the courts, and only after President Dwight D. Eisenhower intervened was the Supreme
Court decision enforced.
Regardless of what many would consider to be a positive outcome in the Little Rock
example, it is clear that little moral deliberation took place here. This is not meant as a critique of
the Brown v. Board decision, or of President Eisenhower, but it provides an example of
attempting to persuade without deliberation. While there was certainly legal deliberation in the
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Supreme Court case, there was little evidence that either side of the debate considered the other’s
position as moral, and certainly not complex.
The morally deliberative mode of persuasion does come later in the Civil Rights
movement in the example of Martin Luther King Jr. Unlike previous attempts at persuasion,
which focused on legal victories, King wanted to legitimately persuade. He understood the
American founding, and appealed to its ideas to make his own case:
When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and
the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every
American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men would be guaranteed the
inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is obvious today that
America has defaulted on this promissory note insofar as her citizens of color are
concerned. (1963)
King was, in essence, pointing out the contradiction in the minds of American white
supremacists, and the legal institutions that upheld their ideas. King is asking that America cease
tolerating these contradictory ideas. To do this, King had to reside in a state of moral tolerance
with the very people who believed he was a second-rate citizen. It is to his credit that he
extended this hand of moral tolerance to his fellow Americans, so that they might have the
opportunity to choose the good of racial equality.

Chapter 7: Moral Tolerance in American Political Thought
The distinction between transactional tolerance and moral tolerance is not always clear in
American political thought, as the ends of the American constitutional order are themselves
disputed. It is also difficult to differentiate the two generally, simply because they are
fundamentally differences in motives, rather than differences in action. Still, after having made a
general case in favor of moral tolerance over transactional tolerance, this chapter will seek to
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show how moral tolerance has developed in the American context. It will study the intellectual
history of morality in American political thought, particularly James Madison, and how moral
questions are dealt with in a federalist system.
The American founding is typically understood to be a part of modern political thought,
but nonetheless distinctive from other modern philosophies. In Federalist 10, James Madison
envisions a large and complex society with diverse interests. This diversity prevents any single
majority from achieving power over an extended period of time. Thus, as Madison argues, a
large and complex nation is preferable to a small and unified nation. This theory of pluralism
should sound familiar to the reader, as Locke envisioned the Letter a tolerant society whose
strength, in part, derived from its neutrality toward any one vision of the good. Without a single
authority to dictate this vision, the alternative would seem to be an amalgamation of personal
opinions and beliefs that compete with each other (much like the Columbia students trampling
paths in the grass, mentioned at the opening of Chapter 5). Braybrooke (2001), in comparing
Locke’s natural law with that of Aquinas, makes precisely this point about Locke and other
moderns (34-5). Yet, it is unclear that such a claim can be made about Madison and his extended
republic. The founders made frequent appeals to virtue, and its role in American government. It
is worth investigating, then, the various claims made about morality in American politics, and
how the founders intended to treat deep moral differences in such a large and diverse society.
A common interpretation of the American founding is that the Madisonian structure of
the American republic allowed each individual to act out of self-interest, and that this served to
benefit the common good. One account of this claim is in an essay by Martin Diamond (1992),
who claimed that democracy was necessary to the Madisonian framework. Specifically, this
democracy would be one that encouraged “immediate profit” (34). This understanding of the
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American founding was certainly present during the founding itself. Thomas Pownall, a former
governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, understood that the American founding was
endeavoring in something that had not been tried before. While the American founding
simultaneously upheld “personal liberty” and “political freedom,” past regimes “Forced nature.
Not finding the natural situation of men to be what it was necessary to the System of their Polity
it should be, they endeavored to make it what it never could be” (quoted in Rahe 1992, 49). We
see in this view the claim that the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the
founding writ large are without moral content. By refusing to “force nature,” government allows
each individual to pursue the vision of the good on their own, while tolerating those who are
different. One should feel no obligation to impose one’s vision of the good upon another.
Again, the reader should recognize here themes of transactional tolerance. Yet, other scholarship
disagrees with the amoral conception of the American founding. West (2017), responding
directly to the claims of Diamond, shows how Madison saw an inseparable connection between
virtue and good government (170-72). West relies on Madison to refute this claim in three ways,
all of which are important here. First, Madison believed that virtuous individuals were necessary
for republican government:
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of
circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a
certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the
existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures
which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of
the human character, the inference would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men
for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them
from destroying and devouring one another. (Federalist 55)
This argument by Madison supports a conception of the American republic as virtuous, or at
least seeking virtue, but it is still unclear that this is a republic that seeks to encode virtue into
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law. Here, West again provides the example of Madison to respond to this concern. Defending
the separation of powers, Madison famously declares in Federalist 51 that “Ambition must be
made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional
rights of the place” (quoted in West 2017, 171). West correctly points out that the ambition
Madison is referring to here still has limits. An ambitious president still cannot write his own
laws, nor can an ambitious legislature enforce its own law. The “parchment barriers” erected by
the Constitution only work if leaders possess the virtue to respect them. The limits to this
ambition are the unwritten virtues within the Constitution.
West’s final claim against Diamond’s conception of an amoral founding is the one most
relevant to the issue of moral tolerance. West quotes Madison writing in the National Gazette,
about the ability of the Republican Party of the day to consolidate public opinion, serving to
unify the country: “the less the supposed differences of interests, and the greater the concord and
confidence throughout the great body of the people, the more readily must they sympathize with
each other” (quoted in West 2017, 171; see also Miller 2007). Madison appears to be
contradicting himself here with his position in Federalist 10, that removing the causes of faction
is worse than the effects of faction itself. As Miller (2007) points out, however, Madison was
equally concerned about the effect of excessive faction in a large republic (564-65). There had to
be a sense of moral commonality throughout. What Madison envisioned, then, was a certain
level of moral consolidation that occurred outside the dictates of a powerful few. Rather, it was
morally deliberative and republican, much in the sense Tocqueville would describe some two
decades later.
We see now that Madison envisioned a republic that was diverse in opinion and belief,
but capable of unifying, or “consolidating,” around moral goods. This bears out in the federalist
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structure of American government. The example of Utah was shared earlier as a place with
significant consolidation around moral goods, or in this case, membership in a single religion
constituting a majority of the state. This is despite the fact that the same religion accounts for a
small minority of the national population. Under the federalist system of American government,
this national minority is effectively granted an outsized voice in national politics, thanks to
institutions like equal representation in the Senate and the Electoral College, but this outsized
voice is possible only because of geographic consolidation. Hence, American federalism gives an
advantage to minorities that are geographically consolidated.
This would seem to be an example of transactional tolerance, due to the segregation of
parties away from another so that they may invade on each other as little as possible. Indeed,
arguments have been made that American federalism serves only to fan the flames of
polarization and atomization. This claim, however, misses the forest for the trees, in that it
misses the way interests are the primary actors on the American political stage. Though Diamond
was wrong about the amorality of Madisonian republicanism, he was correct when he wrote in
the same essay that “Madison’s whole scheme essentially comes down to this. The struggle of
classes is to be replaced by a struggle of interests” (1992, 33). It is true that “interests” is a
broader term than “goods” in the Thomistic sense, but it does not preclude goods from the debate
either. The federalist structure of the Constitution allows broad conceptions of the good life to be
deliberated and adopted. Debates can be had between interests, both large and small, on the
national stage. This is a framework for moral tolerance, as it allows others space to disagree,
while also maintaining the tools for persuasion.
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CONCLUSION

On a cold night in November 1861, the abolitionist poet and author Julia Ward Howe
composed the lyrics to “Battle Hymn of the Republic,” an anthem of the Union cause during the
Civil War. Howe, whose husband helped fund the handiwork of abolitionist martyr John Brown,
wanted to combine Christian piety and the martial spirit of the day. For Howe, abolitionism and
annihilation of the Confederacy were Christian endeavors that should be understood through
Christian scripture and song. This martial piety is best seen in the fifth and final verse written by
Howe: “In the beauty of lilies Christ was born across the sea / With a glory in his bosom that
transfigures you and me / As he died to make men holy let us die to make men free / While God
is marching on!” The third line of this verse is especially notable, as it asks listeners to die for the
cause of freedom.
Few Christian hymns explicitly call on their adherents to die for something, especially for
something other than Christ and his teachings. It should come as no surprise, then, that soon after
publication, people began altering this line to “As he died to make men holy let us live to make
men free,” much to the frustration of Howe and others (Stauffer 2013, 96). As the song grew in
popularity, even after the war was over, disagreement over this line continued. When the
Mormon Tabernacle Choir’s rendition of the song won them a Grammy in 1959, they used the
altered version of the fifth verse. At the memorial service held in Washington D.C. three days
after the 9/11 attacks, the Navy’s Sea Chanters sang “Battle Hymn of the Republic,” but this time
with the original lyrics (Stauffer 2013, 7). Along with questions about the role of a martial spirit
in Christian piety, this slight lyric change also raises questions about the place of tolerance in
political rhetoric. No one dies for a cause they do not absolutely believe in, at least they do not
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hope to. When military leaders try to summon the “last full measure of devotion” from their
soldiers, they do not appeal to ideas or beliefs that are in doubt. Rather, they appeal to ideas that
will not receive an inch of compromise. In these moments, there is no room for doubt or
difference. When Julia Ward Howe asks us to die for the cause of freedom, she is closing the
door on tolerance.
To live for a cause, by contrast, is to keep this door open. It means we fight for something
up to, but not including, death, because we understand there is some other cause at least equally
great worth living for. We may, for example, live for the cause of a political party. We may hold
strongly to our party’s beliefs, but most of us understand that fighting to the death for a political
party may compromise the purpose of the party itself: to better our nation or community. We
have to give space to others that differ in some important ways, but align in other important
ways. This recognition of complexity, both within individuals and the political community,
points to the importance of tolerance.
It has been the claim of this thesis that tolerance is good for the political community, but
only as an instrumental good for the sake of acquiring reason about more fundamental goods.
The writings of John Locke in the Treatise and Letter have aided in pointing to two different
understandings of tolerance. The first conception was one of tolerance as its own end, where
individuals seek neutral protections and then abandon the difficulties of moral deliberation. The
second was a conception of tolerance as a way to allow for reasoned deliberation. While Locke
presents both conceptions as viable, he does not clarify if one is more desirable than the other.
This clarification is offered in the work of Thomas Aquinas, who perceived the individual as
capable of reason and able to comprehend the natural law. A proper understanding of the natural
law includes a proper understanding of the true nature of man’s capacity for reason and choice.
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Moral tolerance is desirable on both Lockean and Thomistic grounds. With it, moral goods are
recognized, even by law, while also being freely chosen and reflective of a liberal government.
By recognizing moral goods, while also recognizing the need to choose moral goods, political
leaders make a prudential decision between competing goods.
Moral debates in politics are fraught with emotion and division. We do not want to
abandon our positions for political expediency, but many of us also feel the competing desire to
unite with our countrymen, despite our differences. Moral debate should be had, but we need not
fight to the death for our positions. Tolerance is necessary, not because it is politically expedient
for national unity, true as that might be. Rather, it is necessary because the moral goods we are
fighting for are only good if they are chosen. Some tolerance must be allowed, then, so that
others can benefit from that choice. For those interested in promulgating the common good of
political society, tolerance of a certain type is indeed a cause worth living for.
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